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Abstract
This paper proposes a discriminating hypothesis apt to distinguish between two paradigms of
international trade: (1) Constant-Returns-Perfect-Competition (CRS-PC) and (2) Increasing-
Returns-Monopolistic-Competition (IRS-MC). The discriminating hypothesis rests on the
different degree of home bias among “consumers”. It predicts a positive relationship between a
country’s share of world’s output (in any particular sector) and the country’s share of world’s
home biased expenditure if the sector is IRS-MC and no relationship if the sector is CRS-PC.
Accordingly, six sectors (covering 43.85% of industrial activity) are associated with IRS-MC,
nine sectors (30.15% of industrial activity) with the CRS-PC paradigm. Results were not
conclusive for the remaining three sectors.
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Introduction
Explaining the determinants of international specialization is one of the most important
questions in international economics. The last thirty years have witnessed a competition
between two theoretical paradigms: one characterized by Constant Returns and Perfect
Competition (CRS-PC) and the other one characterized by Increasing Returns and
Monopolistic Competition (IRS-MC). The two paradigms are not mutually exclusive. On the
contrary, as shown for instance in Helpman and Krugman (1985), they may coexist in a single
model where some sectors are governed by IRS-MC while some others are governed by CRS-
PC. In order to assess the relative importance of the two paradigms, therefore, it seems
important to ascertain which sectors can be associated with which paradigm. This requires a
discriminating hypothesis suitable for empirical testing. This is the scope of this paper. In the
theoretical part, I identify a discriminating hypothesis that permits to discern between the
paradigms. In the empirical part, I associate industrial sectors with paradigms. The empirical
investigation shows that, on the bases of the discriminating hypothesis, about 44% of the
industrial activity can be associated with the IRS-MC paradigm and about 30% with the CRS-
PC paradigm. The remaining 16% yield ambiguous results.
1. Related Literature
Several studies have attempted to assess the importance of the two paradigms. A first group of
studies pertains to the empirical industrial organization literature, for a review see Scherer and
Ross (1990) and Tybout (1993). These studies focused on the direct measure of economies of
scales and found little supporting evidence in favor of their existence. A second group of
studies focused on intra-industry trade as evidence of the importance of the IRS-MC paradigm,
for a review see Leamer and Levinsohn (1995). Helpman (1987) is a milestone work in this
group. He derives a formulation of the gravity equation explicitly from an IRS-MC type of
model. The excellent empirical performance of the derived gravity equation on data for the
OECD countries stood for long time in support of the IRS-MC paradigm. Recently, the IRS-MC
paradigm has been challenged on two grounds. First, theoretical studies, such as Davis (1995,
and 1997), Chipman (1992), Deardorff (1995), and Falvey and Kierzkowski (1987)
demonstrated that intra-industry trade could be generated also by amended versions of the
CRS-PC paradigm. Second, Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) showed that the gravity equations
fitted excellently on the set of non-OECD countries, a piece of evidence at odds with the
assumptions of the IRS-MC paradigm. Feenstra, Markusen, and Rose (1998) reconcile this
finding with theory. They argue that the gravity equation is compatible with CRS-PC but its
empirical performance depends on the underlying model. They find that, consistently with the
theory, differentiated commodities exhibit higher domestic income export elasticity than
homogeneous goods. Lack of convincing evidence in support of the IRS-MC paradigm is also
the result of two studies by Harrigan (1994 and 1996). In a more recent study, Harrigan (1997)
finds evidence in support of a generalized version of the CRS-PC model where factor
2endowments and technologies jointly determine international specialization. Additional
evidence in favor of emended models of factor endowments that include technological
differences and home biased demand are found in Trefler (1995) and Davis and Weinstein
(1998c).
The magnification effect. An innovative approach is found in a series of three papers by
Davis and Weinstein (1996, 1998a, 1998b). Their focus is on the importance of the New
Economic Geography (NEG) as a paradigm for international specialization. The novelty of
their approach is that they identify and use a clear-cut discriminating hypothesis. This
discriminating hypothesis allows them to distinguish between the NEG and the CRS-PC
paradigm with trade costs (henceforth CRS-PC-T). They make use of an exclusive feature of
NEG models that appears, in different settings, in Krugman (1980), Helpman and Krugman
(1985), and in Weder (1995). The feature is that demand idiosyncrasies are reflected on the
pattern of specialization more than one for one, thus giving place to a sort of magnification
effect.1 Conversely, in a CRS-PC-T model, there is no magnification effect. The magnification
effect serves as the basis for empirical investigation. Sectors that exhibit the magnification
effect are associated with the NEG paradigm while sectors that do not exhibit the magnification
effect are associated with CRS-PC-T. In their first paper, Davis and Weinstein find that all the
industrial sectors fail to exhibit the magnification effect. On this ground they reject the
economic geography model in favor of a comparative advantage model with trade costs. Using
the same methodology, in the second paper they conclude in favor of NEG as a paradigm for
regional specialization within a country. Their third paper differs from the first two by
introducing a dissipation parameter related to bilateral trade costs between each pair of
countries. Regressing output against dissipated idiosyncratic demand showed evidence of the
magnification effect in a number of sectors. This new evidence led to the acceptance of NEG as
a relevant paradigm for international specialization. The dramatic contrast between the
conclusion to their first paper and the conclusion to their third paper reflects the extreme
sensitivity of the discriminating hypothesis to the way trade costs are modeled and captured by
econometric techniques. This is certainly not a criticism to their approach (this paper is greatly
inspired by theirs), rather, it is an acknowledgement of the difficulty of the task. In this paper, I
propose a discriminating hypothesis that is free from this fragility for it does not rest on the
presence or absence of trade costs. It is convenient to start by examining the following stylized
facts.
2. Descriptive Statistics About Import Shares
One documented stylized fact about demand is that it is home biased. There is a substantial
amount of empirical research showing the consequences of home biased demand on trade flows
and/or on the pattern of specialization. This literature includes Davis and Weinstein (1998c),
Lundb@ck and Torstensson (1998), Rauch (1996), Trefler (1995), Wei (1996), Brhlhart and
Trionfetti (1998), and, in a different perspective, Helliwell (1996), and McCallum (1995). In
particular, Trefler’s influential work shows that the home bias is responsible (together with
technological differences) for the mystery of the “missing trade”.
One interesting and yet overlooked feature of the home bias is that not all sources of
demand seem to be equally home biased. The home bias is not observable directly, yet, other
                                                            
1 This feature is also known as the “home-market” effect. Yet, in the context of this paper, it seems preferable
to follow Davis and Weinstein and use the term “magnification” effect.
3things equal, a home biased consumer would import less than a consumer who is not home
biased. Thus, comparing import shares across sources of demand may give an estimate of
which sources are more home biased than others. Input-output tables give this information
(Eurostat, 1992). For each country, the tables report 63 domestic sources of demand (the
complete list is in Table A1 in the Appendix). Import shares are computed for each source of
demand and for each category of commodity. The import share obtains by dividing the
expenditure on imported items by total expenditure on that item. As an example, Table 1
reports the import shares of some of the 63 different sources of demand in the Office Machines
sector in Germany (to save space, the table reports only 15 sources). Some sources of demand
import every office machine they buy (ie, import share = 1), some other sources relay totally on
domestic suppliers (ie, import share = 0), and some others are in between.
Table A2 in the Appendix reports the minimum, the maximum, the average and the standard
deviation of import shares across all sources of demand and across countries for 18 NACE
industrial sectors. In many cases, the observed import shares cover the entire possible range,
ie, from zero to one.
The determinants of the home bias may change across different sources of demand. It is
natural than, that different sources of demand have different import shares.2 This paper uses the
stylized fact that import shares differ across sources of demand for two purposes. (1) It derives
a discriminating hypothesis apt to distinguish between the two paradigms of international trade;
and (2) perform an empirical test.
3.  A Preview Of The Discriminating Hypothesis
Consider a world composed of two countries (1 and 2), each endowed with 100 units of labour
(for simplicity, the only factor of production and total population). Only two commodities are
produced: food (a homogeneous good subject to CRS-PC) and washing machines (a
differentiated commodity subject to IRS-MC). There are two “kinds” of consumers: the
“machine kind” who buys only washing machines, and the “food kind” who buys only food.
Within each of these kinds, there are two “types”. One type is “home biased” and spends all
her/his income on domestic commodities while the other is “ordinary” and is indifferent about
the country of production of commodities. Assume that, initially, there are 50 “machine kind”
and 50 “food kind” of consumers in each country. Within each kind, in each country there are
20 “home biased” and 30 “ordinary” consumers. As an initial equilibrium take a situation in
which output of food and machines is 50 euros in each country (for the sake of the example I
use a common currency). As a result of these assumptions, aggregate home biased expenditure
on food is 20 euros in each country and so is aggregate home biased expenditure on machines.
Now consider the following thought experiment. Suppose that, within the food kind only, the
ratio of home biased to ordinary consumers increases to 25/25 in country 1 and decreases to
15/35 in 2. This means that country 1 increases its share of world home biased demand from
20/40 to 25/40. Note that there is no idiosyncratic demand in this experiment. Indeed, total
demand for food in each country and worldwide remains constant. Since domestic output (50
euros) exceeds home biased demand (25 euros), there is no consequence on the pattern of
specialization. The only consequence of this experiment is simply that ordinary consumers will
import more but total imports of food remain the same (ie, equal to zero). This simple but
                                                            
2  The theoretical literature identifies various causes of the home bias: psychological bias in final consumption
(Armington, 1969); Government home bias due to political interplay (McAfee and McMillan, 1989; Branco,
1994); multidimensional features of intermediate inputs non conveyed through the price system (Rauch,
1996). In addition, one could speculate that different source of demand face different trade costs. This is an
issue briefly addressed in section A.3 in the Appendix.
4illuminating example for the CRS-MP paradigm is drawn from Baldwin (1970). Let us now
examine the IRS-MC sector. Suppose that, within the “machine kind” only, the ratio of home
biased to ordinary consumers increases to 25/25 in country 1 and decreases to 15/35 in 2.
Total demand for machines in each country and worldwide remains constant. Yet, there is an
effect on the pattern of specialization because expenditure on domestic varieties of machines
has increased in country 1 and decreased in country 2. Therefore, the size of the market for
machines has expanded in country 1 and contracted in country 2. Consequently, new producers
of machines will appear in 1 and some will disappear in 2. Country 1 becomes an exporter of
machines and an importer of food.
This result gives us a discriminating hypothesis based on the relative size of home biased
expenditure. A country that has a relatively larger share of world’s home biased expenditure
on a particular commodity will relatively specialize in the production of that commodity if
the commodity is subject to IRS-MC. Conversely, if the commodity is subject to CRS-PC, the
country’s share of world’s home biased expenditure has no effect on the relative
specialization of the country. Two features of this discriminating hypothesis make it different
from the one of Davis and Weinstein. First, it identifies a home market effect that does not
relate to idiosyncratic demand but to idiosyncratic home biased demand. Second, the
discriminating hypothesis is independent from the presence of trade costs in the model. The
second feature is especially useful for two reasons. First it widens the scope of the test. Indeed,
idiosyncratic home biased demand can be used to distinguish between IRS-MC, and CRS-PC,
while the magnification effect can be used to distinguish only between the NEG and
“everything else” (where “everything else” is CRS-PC-T when trade costs are positive and
both CRS-PC and IRS-MC when trade costs are zero). Second, it frees the discriminating
hypothesis from the extreme sensitivity to the way trade costs are modeled and measured.
Naturally, this is not to say that trade costs are irrelevant. On the contrary, because the
empirical investigation seems to be very sensitive to them, constructing a test that is
independent from them makes the test more reliable.
4.  The Model
The model suitable for the analysis needs to incorporate the paradigm of Constant-Returns-to-
Scale-and-Perfect-Competition (CRS-PC) and the paradigm of Increasing-Returns-to-Scale-
and-Monopolistic-Competition (IRS-MC). To this purpose I will us the widely adopted
framework found in Helpman and Krugman (1985, part III). The world is composed of two
countries indexed by i (i=1, 2) and two homogeneous factors of production indexed by V (V =
L, K). Each country is endowed with a fixed and exogenous quantity Li and Ki of the factors. L
and K are used to produce three commodities indexed by S (S =Y , X, and Z).
4.1  Technologies and factors markets
Commodity Y and Z are assumed to be produced by use of a CRS technology and subject to a
perfectly competitive market structure. The average and marginal cost function associated with
the CRS sector is cS(w,r), where S = Y, Z and w and r are the reward to L and K. Commodity X
is assumed to be subject to an IRS technology that requires a fixed cost f(w,r) and a constant
marginal cost m(w,r). As usual, it is assumed that technologies are identical across countries.
In order to make the factor intensities independent of the scale of the firm it is assumed that the
functions m(w,r) and f(w,r) use factors in the same relative proportion. Thus, the factor
proportion depends only on relative factor prices and not on the scale of the firm. This
convenient assumption is used in Markusen (1986). The average cost function in the X sector is
5cX(w,r,x) = m(w,r)+f(w,r)/x, where x is firm’s output. The number of varieties of X produced
in the world, denoted by N, is endogenously determined and so is ni that denotes the number of
varieties produced in country i. The demand functions for L and K obtain from the cost
functions through the Shephard’s lemma and are denoted by ls(w,r) and ks(w,r). Further, it is
assumed no factor intensity reversal. The efficiency conditions and the market clearing
conditions in the factors market are:
( )rwcp SS ,= ,  S= Y, Z (1a)
( )rwmp X ,)/11( =- s , (1b)
( )xrwcp XX ,,= , (2)
( ) ( ) ( ) iiZiXiY LZrwlxnrwlYrwl =++ ,,, i = 1,2 (3a)
( ) ( ) ( ) iiZiXiY KZrwkxnrwkYrwk =++ ,,, i = 1,2 (3b)
Equations (1a) and (1b) state the usual conditions of price = marginal cost in all sectors and
countries (sigma is the elasticity of substitution among varieties as further illustrated below).
Equation (2) states the zero profit condition in sector X in all countries. Equations (3a) and
(3b) state the market clearing conditions for factors in all countries. These eight equations
describe the supply side of the model. Free trade assures commodity price equalization. In
addition, it is assumed that factor endowments are such that there exists a factors price
equalization set of full dimensionality.
4.2  Home biased and ordinary demand
As anticipated above, the empirical investigation makes use of the difference in the import
shares of various sources of demand observed in the data. Accordingly, it is assumed that there
are two types t of consumers (but one could think of a continuum of them) the “ordinary” type (t
= o) and the “home biased” type (t = h). Accordingly, preferences are described by a CES-
Cobb-Douglas utility function cum home bias. I follow Trefler (1995) and use a simple
parameter to represent an Armington-type of home bias. The utility function of consumer type t
in country i is:
( ) ( ) ( ) ZiZtiZiZtiYiYtiYiYtiXiXtiXiXti
iiiti ZZYYXXU
adadadadadad ---= 111 ,
with:
1=åS Sia .
For simplicity, and without loss of generality, it is assumed that "Soi = "Shi for any i, thus the
type subscript is suppressed. The crucial assumption is that *Soi  *Shi.
Thus, without loss of generality but saving notation, it is assumed that *Soi = 0 for any S
and i, while *Shi > 0 for at least S = X in 1or 2 or both.
In each country there are :i individuals of type h and (Li - :i) individuals of type o. Ii
denotes income of country i and is the inner product between factor endowments and factor
6rewards (it is assumed that individuals -labour- have claims on K).  Iti is the aggregate income
of consumers of type t in country i, where Ihi = :iIi and Ioi = (Li-:i)Ii. Denoting with ESti the
aggregate expenditure of consumers of type t of country i on commodity S, we have ESti = "SiIti.
The utility deriving from the consumption of X as an aggregate of varieties is assumed to be a
CES function with elasticity of substitution among varieties equal to the constant ( )¥Î ,1s .
The aggregate X in the utility function contains all varieties, while the aggregate Xi contains
only domestic variety. Two-stage utility maximization and aggregation over individuals yields
the aggregate expenditure of type t consumers of country i on each domestic variety of the
commodity X. This is:
( ) XtiXtiXXXtiXtiXX EPpEp ddp ssss -+ ---- 11111 ,
where PX is the price index associated with the aggregate X and BXi is the price index
associated with the aggregate Xi. These are:
(PX)1- F = N(pX)1- F, and (BXi)1- F = ni(pXi)1- F .
The ratio,
åi ShiShi EE /
is country i’s share of world’s home biased demand in sector S. The ratio,
ShjShi EE /
is the country i’s relative size of home biased demand. Both of these ratios are used in what
follows and are referred to as idiosyncratic home biased demand. The ratio,
åi SiSi EE /
is country i’s share of world’s demand in sector S. The ratio SjSi EE /  is the country i’s relative
size of demand for S. These two ratios are used in what follows and are referred to as
idiosyncratic demand.
4.3  Equilibrium in the products markets
The equilibrium conditions in the product market are:
( )[ ]
( )[ ] xp=Ep+E E
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xp=E
p+E E
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XXhXh
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XhiXhiXoi
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1
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(4a)
( )212211 YYpEEEE YYhYoYhYo +=+++ (4b)
7and
XhiXhiiX Exnp d³  i = 1,2 (5a)
ShiShiiS ESp d³ ; i = 1,2;  and S = Y,Z. (5b)
By Walras’s law, the equilibrium condition for commodity Z is redundant. The model so far is
standard except for the home-bias. The system (1)-(4) is composed of 11 independent
equations and 12 unknown (pX, pY, pZ, x, n1, n2, Y1, Y2, Z1, Z2, w, r). Taking pY as the numJraire
the system is perfectly determined. The usual conditions of existence and stability of a unique
equilibrium are assumed to hold. Naturally, under appropriate conditions, the dimensionality of
the model could be extended to any V, S and i (see Dixit and Norman, 1980). It is immediate
that the only consequence of the two inequalities (5) is that the size of the factor price
equalization set is reduced.
5.  Discriminating Hypothesis
To illustrate the effect of the relative size of the home biased demand, consider the following
experiment. Assume a change d:1 = - d:2  > 0. This change has the effect of increasing country
1’s share of world’s home biased demand (and country 1’s relative size of home biased
demand) leaving world’s demand and individual countries’ demand unchanged. That is:
dEYh1 = - dEYh2 > 0;  dEXh1 = - dEXh2 > 0, but dEY1 = dEX1 = dEY2 = dEX2 = 0.
The fact that individual country’s demand remains constant rules out idiosyncratic demands.
The remaining effect on output, if any, is due to idiosyncratic home biased demand.
Proposition 1. In the factor price equalization set, home biased idiosyncratic demand is
inconsequential on the pattern of international specialization if the sector is governed by
CRS-PC.
Proposition 1 can be illustrated by simple inspection of (4b). It is apparent that the change
dEYh1 = - dEYh2 leaves the l-h-s of (4b) unaffected. Therefore, in the factor price equalization
set the composition of any country’s expenditure on Y (and Z) is inconsequential on
international specialization. Naturally, if the change dEYh1 implies that (5b) becomes binding
then there is going to be an effect on the pattern of specialization.
Proposition 2. Home biased idiosyncratic demand influences the pattern of specialization if
the sector is governed by IRS-MC. Ceteris paribus, a country tends to specialize in the
production of the commodity for which it has a relatively large share of world’s home
biased demand.
Simple inspection of (4a) gives the intuition. The change dEXh1 = - dEXh2, while it leaves EXi
unchanged, induces a change in the l-h-s of the first equation in (4a) of magnitude,
( )[ ] 021111 >+- --- XhiXhXXhiX-1X dEPPp ddp ssss .
8Inequality holds since (PX)1- F > (BXi)1- F . As a consequence, the solution of the system must
change. This means that the composition of expenditure for the IRS-MP commodity affects
international specialization. Note that, as it is intuitive,
dEXh1 > 0
implies that the demand for domestic varieties increases since,
PXXi 11 -- < ssp .
Then n1 will increase and n2 will decrease. Thus, ceteris paribus, a country with relatively
large share of world’s home biased demand tends to have a relatively larger share of world’
output in the differentiated commodity. Formally, proposition 2 can be proven by direct
solution of sub-system (4a)-(4b). This gives the following reduced forms:
å
=
i
XhiXhi
XhiXhii
E
E
N
n
d
d
(6)
åå=
i t
XtiX ExNp (7)
Propositions 1 and 2 together provides a testable discriminating hypothesis. Equation (6)
provides the basis for the empirical investigation.
Before proceeding to the empirical implementation it is important to address the issue of
trade costs in relation to the magnification effect.
6.  Trade Costs And The Magnification Effect
Trade costs are crucial in economic geography models and the magnification effect criterion
relies entirely on them. Suppose that the X commodity is traded internationally at an iceberg
type trade cost. For one unit of X sent, only a fraction J < 1 arrives at destination. If this is the
case, then the price of X and the price index associated with X will be country specific and
will bear a country index. In particular:
pXi = (1/J) pXj and PXi = [n1(pXi)1-s + n2(pXj)1-s] 1/(1-s).
Naturally, Bi remains unchanged since it is composed of domestic varieties only.
An interesting feature of this set up is that, in the absence of home biased demand, the
IRS-MC sector exhibits a magnification effect. This is to say that idiosyncratic differences in
the size of countries’ expenditure are reflected on the specialization pattern in a magnified
way. The magnification effect can be easily shown in the model of this paper by setting *Xti = 0
for all t and i, replacing the new price indexes in (1)-(4) where appropriate, and solving (4a)
for n1/n2.
This gives:
9( )
( )211
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The interesting feature is in the size of the following derivative:
( )
( )
( )( )
( )[ ] 1/1
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< XXXX EEEEd
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s
s
t t
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(8a)
The magnification effect shows itself in the fact that the derivative is larger than one.3 In words,
a country that has a relatively larger expenditure for the IRS-MC commodity will have a more
than proportionally larger share of world’s output. In contrast, as argued by Davis and
Weinstain (1996, and 1998a, 1998b), in the CRS-PC sectors the derivative,
( ) ( )2121 /// SS EEdSSd ,
is less than one (S = Y or Z) even if J<1. Davis and Weinstain use the magnification effect in
the empirical investigation. Sectors that exhibit the magnification effect are assigned to the
IRS-MC paradigm while sectors that do not exhibit the magnification effect are assigned to the
CRS-PC paradigm.
Proposition 3. In the presence of idiosyncratic home biased demand, idiosyncratic demand
does not necessarily generate a magnification effect.
Proposition 3 is easily proven by resuming the assumption that *Soi  *Shi and differentiating
(4a) around an equilibrium point.4 Total differentiation gives:
( )
( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) XhiXhi
t
XtiXti
XhiXhi
t
XtiXti
XX EE
EE
EEd
nnd
dtdt
dtdt
ss
ss
t
121
112
121
21
5111
111
/
/
--
--
< ++--
++--
=
å
å
     i=1, or 2     
(8b)
Expression in (8b) is not necessarily larger than one. Specifically,
                                                            
3 This derivative appears in Krugman (1980), Helpman and Krugman (1985), Weder (1995) and Davis
and Weinstein (1996, 1998a, 1998b). The inequality holds since, in incomplete specialization, EX1/  EX2 is
bounded. See, for instance, Helpman and Krugman (1985).
4 An alternative way to show the size of the derivative is to solve (4a) for n1/ n2 and than take the
derivative. This route is rather long because it requires the use of Ferrari’s formula to solve a cubic equation.
Total differentiation is more direct and it suffices to show that the derivative in question is not necessarily
larger than one. The point of differentiation is chosen at " S1 = " S2, *St1 = *St2 for every S and t; L1 = L2; and K1
= K2 (there is only intra-industry trade), so that ES1 = ES2. At this point of differentiation n1 =  n2. From this
point we let the expenditure change by dEX1 = -dEX2. This is done by shocking the system by d" X1 = -d" X2. In
this way the composition of expenditure remains unchanged in both countries. Obviously, this derivative is
taken in the domain ( )1,0Ît , at zero trade costs the solution of the system is given by expression (6).
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( )
( ) 1/
/
21
21 <
XX EEd
nnd
 if ( ) ( ) XhiXhit XtiXti EE dtd s 11
2
1 --
<-å .
Since,
( ) ),2(1
2
1 ¥Î- -st
it follows that for any finite,
( ) XhiXhi
t
XtiXti EE dd /1å -
it is possible that the derivative is less than one. Therefore, as long as *Soi  *Shi, it is not
correct to reject the assumption that a sector belong to the IRS-MC paradigm on the grounds
that the estimated value of the derivative in question is less than one.
To be fair, Davis and Weinstein’ third paper amends the empirical implementation of
the previous papers in a substantial way. Since the present work closely relates to theirs I
abstract a moment from the issue of home biased demand and address their third paper more
closely. They note that, because of trade costs, demand from country i “dissipates” before it
“reaches” country j. This can be seen by distinguishing between the term XiE  and the term,
XiE
1-st .
The first one is demand for good X of country i; the second one is demand for good X of
country i as faced by producers in country j. In the empirical implementation they use a gravity
equation to estimate the dissipation parameter 1-st , then they multiply expenditure by it, and
use the resulting “dissipated demand” in the regression in place of the non-dissipated demand
they had used in the first two papers. Then, they associate with the IRS-MC paradigm sectors
that exhibit the magnification effect with respect to dissipated idiosyncratic demand. There
seem to be an inconsistency. The inconsistency appears by taking the derivative of n1/n2 with
respect to the “dissipated” idiosyncratic demand ( )211 / XX EE -st .
Rearranging the expression for n1/n2 as,
( )
( ) ( )21121
1
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1
1
1
2
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/1
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---
-
-
=
ss
sss
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ttt
and taking the derivative with respect to “dissipated” idiosyncratic demand gives:
( )
( )
( )( )( )[ ]
( )[ ]2211
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-
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t
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t
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. (8c)
Expression (8c) is not necessarily larger than one for the dissipation parameter 1-st  can be
arbitrary close to zero. This means that, quite apart from the issue of home biased demand,
dissipated idiosyncratic demand does not necessarily produce a magnification effect.
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Therefore, it is not entirely correct to reject the assumption that a sector belongs to IRS-MC on
the grounds that the estimated value of the derivative (8c) is less than one.
In conclusion, while idiosyncratic demand does not necessarily produce a
magnification effect when some demand is home biased, dissipated idiosyncratic demand does
not necessarily produce the magnification effect even in the absence of home biased demand. It
seems that the magnification effect offers very little reliability as a criterion to distinguish
between paradigms.
The last bit is to show the relationship between n1/n2 and EXh1/E Xh2 in the presence of
trade costs.  This is done by differentiating totally system (4). This gives
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(8d)
where H is a positive term the full expression of which is given in the Appendix and, to
simplify algebra, we set *hi = *hj / * (although *oi  *hi).
Equation (6) or (8d) are utilized to distinguish between CRS-PC and IRS-MC for they hold
for IRS-MC sectors and they do not hold for CRS-PC sectors.
7. Empirical Implementation
This section identifies a testable hypothesis, sets the econometric specification, describes the
data and discusses some econometric issues.
7.1 Econometric specification and discriminating hypothesis
The model predicts that a country share of world output in an IRS-MC sector is positively
related to (1) the country share of world expenditure on that commodity if trade costs are not
zero (equation (8b)) and (2) to the country share of world home biased expenditure (equation
(8d) and/or (6)). Therefore, the following equations are estimated separately (for each sector
S).
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The discriminating hypothesis that serves to associate sectors with paradigms obtains from
Propositions 1 and 2.
Discriminating Hypothesis. A country’s share of world home biased expenditure (in each
sector) is positively related to the country share of world output (in the sector) if the sector
is IRS-MP, and it is not related to it if the sector is CRS-PC.
Table 2 relates the value of parameters with the paradigm of association according to
Propositions 1, 2 and 3. The last two columns relate paradigms to $2 according to Propositions
1 and 2. A positive $2 is consistent with IRS-MC and inconsistent with CRS-PC. Similarly, $2
= 0 is consistent with CRS-PC and inconsistent with IRS-MC. Thus, if the estimate of $2 is
positive and statistically significant, then the sector is associated with IRS-MC. If the estimate
of $2 is not statistically different from zero, then the sector is associated with CRS-PC.
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According to Proposition 3, the parameter $1 cannot to be utilized to discriminate
between paradigms. Yet, the parameter $1 can be utilized to test for the presence of trade costs.
A positive $1 is consistent with positive trade costs and inconsistent with zero trade costs as
shown by equation (8b). Conversely, $1 = 0 is consistent with zero trade costs and inconsistent
with positive trade costs as shown by equation (6). Thus, a statistically positive estimate of $1
is interpreted as an indication of the presence of (important) international trade costs in the
sector. A statistically insignificant $1 is interpreted as absence of (or unimportant) trade costs.
Once again, in contrast with the tests based on the magnification effect, an estimated $1 < 1 is
consistent both with IRS-MC and CRS-PC.
Note that we have not imposed the restriction that there are as many goods as there are
factors. This is welcome, for it widens the theoretical validity of the test. Note that, without
this restrictive assumption, factor endowments are redundant as an explanatory variable since,
when there are more goods than factors, factor endowments do not determine the output pattern
anyway. The fact that the empirical test does not need factor endowments is welcome also
because it frees the test from the problem of relating output data and factor endowment data.
The problem is that the industrial classification of output is only loosely related to measures of
factor intensities (see Maskus, 1991).
A final note is in order. If inequalities (5b) were not satisfied there could be a potential
pitfall in interpreting a positive estimate of $2 as evidence of IRS-MC. Inequalities (5b) can be
inspected directly by use of the data described below. Indeed, as discussed below, direct
inspection has shown no sign of binding (5b).
7.2  Data
The testable hypothesis posits a relationship between three variables: share of output (ni/N),
share of expenditure,
(EXi/3iEXi),
and share of home biased expenditure,
( åi XhiXhiXhiXhi EE dd / ).
Data for the first two variables abound. For the third one the only sources available are input-
output tables. These tables contain: (1) the value of expenditure of each of the sources of total
demand (ie, EXti for all t) and (2) the corresponding import shares. Input-output tables that are
compatible across countries are in Eurostat (1985). A limitation of this data set is that it
includes only eight countries, but it has two advantages. First, it includes a separate input-
output table of imports from which one can compute the import shares. Second, the input-output
tables permit to address the problem of simultaneity and causality in a simple way (see below).
The tables refer to the year 1985 only. They includes eight countries identified by i (i =
de, dn, es, fr, ir, it, nl, uk) and 18 industrial sectors identified by S (see Table A1 in the
Appendix for the complete list of sectors). The output share (ni/N) is measured by Value
Added. The values of EXi are directly computed from the input-output tables by summing
expenditure over all sources of demand, that is 3tEXti. The input-output database counts 63
sources of demand for each country, ie, t = 1,…63 (the complete list is in Table A2 in the
Appendix). The presence of the home bias cannot be observed directly. Yet, if a component of
expenditure is particularly home biased it must exhibit particularly low import shares. The
observed import share serves as a criterion by which to split total demand between home
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biased and ordinary. I have used two splitting criteria. I call the first one the “below average”
criterion. This criterion sorts the Home Biased (HB) sources of demand as follows. First, I
ranked the sources of demand according to their import share. Second, I label those sources
below average import share as Home Biased while the other ones I labeled as Ordinary. For
each sector, the demand of Home Biased sources were summed up. This sum is the variable
EXhi, aggregation over countries gives,
åi XhiE .
This criterion is admittedly arbitrary. Its arbitrariness, however, may result in an
underestimation of the importance of IRS-MC. Indeed, according to the discriminating
hypothesis, if a sector is CRS-PC any repartition of aggregate expenditure into two or more
groups will yield a non-significant $2. Instead, if the sector is IRS-MC, an inaccurate
identification of the home biased and ordinary sources may result in a non-significant $2. Thus
the arbitrariness, at the most, contributes to an underestimation of the importance of IRS-MC.
To make sure that the results of the estimation do not rest on this specific split, I have computed
a second split that I call “twice below average”. This criterion yields the Strongly Home
Biased (SHB) sources of demand. The computation is straightforward. I rank by import share
the sources of demand already classified as home biased according to the below average
criterion. I take the average import share of this group and classify as Strongly Home Biased
the component of expenditure exhibiting an import share below the average of the Home
Biased. For each sector, the expenditure of all the Strongly Home Biased components have
been summed up. This sum is a new measure of the variable EXhi, aggregation over countries
gives a new measure of,
åi XhiE .
A final note is in order. Home biased demand was compared to the size of output (by
sector and country) to ascertain that inequalities (5) are indeed satisfied. The ratios,
xnpE iXXhiXhi /d
are all smaller than 1 and most of them are below ½. The highest value is 0.76, found in sector
Metal Products in Germany. This means that inequalities (5) are fare from being binding.
7.3  Advantages and disadvantages of input-output data
The use of the Input-output table is dictated by the need to have data on the expenditure and
import share of each single source of demand. Some features of this data set are worth
discussing.
Micronumerosity. Each regression relies on a very small sample size of only eight cross-
sectional observations (eight countries).5 The major consequence of micronumerosity is large
confidence intervals (see Goldberger, 1991, pp. 248-50 for a detailed treatment). In our
context, this effect increases the probability of accepting the hypothesis $2 = 0. This means a
possible underestimation of the importance of the IRS-MC paradigm. In addition, the point
                                                            
5 The existing literature does slightly better. For instance, Davis and Weinstein (1996) individual sector runs
rely on 13 observation and nine degrees of freedom.
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estimates are sensitive to sample size. It should be noted, however, that micronumerosity
leaves intact the fact that the least square estimator is BLUE.
Reversed causality. Regressing output on expenditure raises the following problem. Suppose
that one finds that output patterns correlate with demand patterns, this is subject to two
interpretations. It could be that, as posited by the model, output patterns respond to demand
patterns. Alternatively, it is possible that output patterns determined by causes outside the
model induce matching demand patterns. For instance, suppose that for reasons outside the
model country i is relatively specialized in industry S. Suppose also that industry S requires a
large share of its output as its own input. Then, it is trivial that country i will have relatively
large demand for S. The causal chain is from output to demand via intermediate inputs. This
causal chain is unrelated to the home market effect but creates the statistical illusion of it. This
problem is not easy to disentangle. Davis and Weinstein (1996, and 1998b especially through
pages 29-31) acknowledge that all their results may be influenced by this problem. The input-
output tables allow for a simple solution to this problem. That is to remove the main diagonal
from the input-output matrix when computing EXhi.
Simultaneity. Previous studies have used trade data to measure EXi by subtracting net exports
from production. This method is subject to the following problem. If production is high in one
year, then the residual measure of EXi is also high, simply because it is obtained by subtracting
the trade balance from output and not because high expenditure caused output to increase.
Davis and Weinstein (1996, p. 31, and 1998b) acknowledge this problem. The input-output
tables are immune from this problem for output and expenditure data (horizontal and vertical
entries) are collected from independent sources.
Note that both reversed causality and simultaneity may generate the illusion of the
magnification effect but do not generate the illusion of large home biased demand. Therefore,
while reversed causality and simultaneity are serious problems for a test based on the
magnification effect, they are only a minor problem for the test based on home biased
expenditure.
8. Estimation
Tables 3 to 6 summarize the results of OLS regressions. Each row reports the results for one
sector. For the sectors where the estimated $2 is not statistically significant, the second line
reports the result of re-estimating the equation using the first variable only. The constant was
not significant in any regression and has been eliminated. The first set of estimation uses the
full input-output matrix (section 8.1, Tables 3 and 4). The second set of estimation uses the
same matrix but without the diagonal (section 8.2, Tables 4 and 5). This is done in order to
remove the potential reversed causality problem. Within each set of regressions, I have used
two measures of home biased demand. In Tables 3 and 5 I used the measure labelled as HB, in
Tables 4 and 6 I used the measured labeled as SHB. This is done to check the robustness of the
results to the split criterion. All regressions use the White’s correction method for
heteroscedasticity.
8.1  Estimation using the full matrix
Both tables (3 and 4) show estimates of $2 not statistically different from zero for ten sectors
out of eighteen. These ten sectors, therefore, are associated with the CRS-PC paradigm. Both
tables show estimates of $2 statistically different from zero (positive) for seven sectors: Metal-
Products (X190), Agricultural-and-Industrial-Machines (X210), Electrical-Goods (X250),
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Motor Vehicles (X270), Pulp-Paper-and-Printing-Products (X470), Rubber-and-Plastic-
Products (X490), and Other-Manufactures (X510). Therefore, these sectors are associated with
the IRS-MC paradigm. The sectors Timber-and-Furniture (450), give ambiguous results for $2
is statistically significant in Table 3 but not in Table 4. It is comforting to see that the
estimation results largely confirm the belief that manufactures are associated with IRS-MC
while food and beverages are associated with CRS-PC. It is interesting to note that in most
sectors $2 is either “strongly” significant (very small P in both tables) or “not at all” (very
large P in both tables). This is reassuring, for it suggests that micronumerosity (large
confidence intervals) may not influence the results so strongly one may suspect. Finally, one
may observe that the estimation results are substantially robust to the way home biased
expenditure is selected. Out of eighteen sectors only Timber and Furniture (X470) is sensitive
to the split criterion.
8.2  Estimation removing the diagonal
Tables 5 and 6 show the results of the estimation obtained by removing the diagonal from the
input-output matrix. Two sectors out of eighteen exhibit a qualitative change in the estimated
parameters as the result of the elimination of the diagonal. These are Agricultural and Industrial
Machines (X210) and Chemical Products (X170). The sector Agricultural and Industrial
Machines (X210) passes from being associated with IRS-MC to being associated with CRS-
PC. This could, in principle, be due to reversed causality. The sector Chemical Products
(X170) passes from CRS-PC to IRS-MC. This is quite strange and does not have a clear
theoretical explanation. Overall, except for Agricultural and Industrial Machines and except for
the curious case of Chemical Products, it seems that reversed causality is not an overwhelming
problem.
In addition to the comparison between the Full Matrix runs and the No-Diagonal runs
we can compare the HB with the SHB runs. In the last two sets of runs (Tables 5 and 6) as well
as in the previous ones (Tables 3 and 4) the sector Timber and Furniture (X450) is sensitive to
the split criterion. In the Full Matrix run, as well as in the No-Diagonal run the estimated $2
becomes insignificant when we pass from the HB to the SHB criterion. It seems as if something
specific to this sector makes it sensitive to the split.
8.3  Summary
Table 7 summarizes the results. Nine sectors exhibit an estimated $2 statistically not different
from zero in all the estimation runs and, therefore, are unambiguously associated with the CRS-
PC paradigm.6 A star (*) indicates association with the IRS-MC paradigm in a particular type
of estimation runs.
In six sectors the estimated $2 is statistically positive in all estimation run (four *).
These sectors are unambiguously associated with the IRS-MC paradigm. These sectors appear
in Table 7 individually and, in the last row, as a group labeled as X..IRS-MC. Estimation
results are not conclusive for three sectors. Although the results are not conclusive, there seems
to be a pattern for two of them. Sector X450 is sensitive to the split criterion in the same way
in both sets of runs, sector X210 seems affected by reversed causality.  Finally, all sectors in
all runs, except Chemical Products in Table 5, exhibit a significant $1 which, according to
theory, is evidence of important trade costs.
                                                            
6 These sectors are: X230, X290, X310, X330, X350, X370, X390, X410, and X430. To save space in Table 7
these sectors are labeled as “X..CRS-PC”.
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CRS-PC versus IRS-MC. Table 7 can be used to assess the relative importance of the two
paradigms. The second column of the Table shows the size of industrial sector as share of the
total. The nine sectors unambiguously associated with the CRS-PC paradigm account for
30.15% the value added of the industrial activity while the six sectors unambiguously
associated with the IRS-MC paradigm account for 43.85% it. The total at the bottom of each of
the last four columns indicates the percentage of industrial activity accounted for by the sectors
market by a star (*) in the column.
The Magnification effect and home biased demand. In all the runs, none of the estimated $1
is statistically larger than one. Had we taken the magnification effect as a discriminating
hypothesis, then we would have concluded that none of the sectors could be associated with the
IRS-MC paradigm. More interestingly, in most of the sectors associated with IRS-MC the
value of $1 is less than 1 with 95% probability (see sixth column of Tables 2-5). According to
the magnification effect, this would have led us to associate these sectors with the CRS-PC
paradigm. This reveals that interpreting the results according to the magnification effect may be
very misleading. Davis and Weinstein (1996, page 42 and Tables 7) find that only two out of
42 4-digit sectors exhibit the magnification effect. They repeat the estimation runs at 3-digit
level (their Table 8) and find that none of the sixteen 3-digit sectors exhibits the magnification
effect. Even the third paper (1998b) shows little evidence of the magnification effect in the
individual sector runs.7 In the light of the theoretical model of the present paper, this absence of
the magnification effect is not surprising. Indeed the empirical evidence of this investigation
confirms that of Davis and Weinstein (1996, and 1998b), namely, that there is no evidence of
the magnification effect. Yet, the conclusion is different. Indeed the theoretical part of this
paper has shown that absence of the magnification effect does not imply absence of IRS-MC.
9. Pooling Sectors
The results of the regression runs obtained in the previous section can be used to pool sectors
belonging to the same paradigm. Thus, all sectors associated with CRS-PC can be pooled as if
they belonged to one single sector. Similarly, all sectors associated with IRS-MC can be
pooled. Pooling data in this way is consistent with the statistical findings of the previous
section. The estimates of $2, while they are statistically different across paradigms, are not
statistically different across sectors in the same paradigm. Naturally, running pooled regression
does not serve the purpose of associating sectors with paradigms. The purpose is to run
regressions with a larger number of degree of freedom and, therefore, to acquire more
confidence in the statistical validity of the regressions. If the association of sectors with
paradigms according to the individual sector runs were not robust, probably the results would
not be confirmed by the pooled regressions.
The following equation has been estimated using OLS.
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for all S associated with IRS-MC and, separately, for all S associated with CRS-PC.
The sectors to be included in the IRS-MC set and CRS-PC set are taken from the
previous section. Table 7 lists five possible sets of association of sectors with paradigms.
                                                            
7 The industries they associate with IRS-MC are Food Products, Beverages, Textile, and Wood Products
Except Furniture (see Davis and Weinstein 1998b, Table 5).
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Consequently, I have run five sets of pooled estimations. One of them I call “minimalist”, and
correspond to the grouping X..CRS-PC and X..IRS-MC. The other four correspond to the last
four columns of Table 7. The results are shown in Table 8 that is composed of five sub-tables
reflecting the structure of Table 7. The results confirm what already found in the previous
section. The parameter $2 is statistically insignificant in the CRS-PC sectors (l-h-s of Table 8)
but statistically significant in the IRS-MC sectors (r-h-s of Table 8). None of the estimates of
$1 is statistically larger than one and, in the IRS-MC sectors, all estimates of $1 are statistically
smaller than one. Once more, this shows that the test based on the magnification effect fails to
capture the presence of increasing returns and monopolistic competition. All estimates of $2
are statistically positive in the IRS-MC as expected. Standard errors are very small (small P)
for all significant parameters.
Conclusion
This paper addresses the question of how to distinguish between the CRS-PC paradigm and the
IRS-MC paradigm.
The theoretical part of the paper develops a discriminating hypothesis that uses the
observed fact that different sources of demand have different import shares. The discriminating
hypothesis posits a positive relationship between a country share of world output (in any
particular sector) and the country share of world home biased expenditure in IRS-MC sector
and no relationship in CRS-PC sectors. This discriminating hypothesis seems theoretically
more robust than the one based on the magnification effect. Indeed, differences in import shares
are well documented and their theoretical consequences are that the magnification effect looses
its validity as criterion to distinguish between paradigms. In addition, the fact that the
discriminating hypothesis does not rest on the presence or absence of trade costs gives it a
wider scope. This is because idiosyncratic home biased demand can be used to distinguish
between IRS-MC, and CRS-PC, while the magnification effect can be used to distinguish only
between economic geography and “everything else”.
On the empirical side, the major limitation seems to be micronumerosity. The
individual sector regressions relay on eight observations and six degrees of freedom.
However, the pooled regressions, whose results are consistent with the individual sector runs,
rely on a number of observations that range from 48 to 88. The results of the four sets of
individual sector estimations and the two sets of pooled estimation seem substantially robust to
the criteria of identification of home biased demand. The causality problem seems to affect, at
most, one sector.
Overall, the investigation associated six sectors (covering 43.85% of industrial
activity) with the IRS-MC paradigm and nine sectors (30.15% of industrial activity) with the
CRS-PC paradigm. The results were not conclusive for three sectors.
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Table 1
Sources of demand and corresponding import shares
I151 I153 I155 I170 I230 I330 I350 I450 I510 I690 I710 I810
1 0 0.67 0.29 0.54 0 0.1 0 0 0.40 0.26 0.16
Table 2
Association of parameters value with paradigms
$1 Trade costs $2 Paradigm
+ J < 1 + IRS-MC
+ J < 1 0 CRS-PC
0 J = 1 + IRS-MC
0 J = 1 0 CRS-PC
Table 3
Full Matrix, HB
Sectors $1 St. error t-stat P $1 < 1 (5%) $2 St. error t-stat P Adj. R2 F Paradigm
170 Chem. Prod. 0.86
0.98
0.176
0.057
4.878
16.88
0.0028
0.000…
0.10 0.11 0.92 0.39 0.96
0.96
155 CRS-PC
190 Metal Prod. 0.92 0.027 34.75 0.000… Yes 0.09 0.01 5.16 0.002 0.99 1205 IRS-MC
210 Agr & Ind. M. 0.89 0.031 28.26 0.000… Yes 0.12 0.03 4.00 0.007 0.99 1495 IRS-MC
230 Office Mach. 1.10
1.02
0.150
0.057
7.317
17.99
0.0003
0.000…
-0.06 0.097 -0.673 0.52 0.94
0.95
127
250 Electrical goods 0.71 0.029 24.13 0.000… Yes 0.30 0.018 15.87 0.000… 0.99 5155 IRS-MC
270 Motor veicl. 0.70 0.093 7.474 0.0003 Yes 0.34 0.036 9.329 0.0001 0.98 522 IRS-MC
290 Other transp.
       Equip
1.16
0.99
0.188
0.117
6.209
8.471
0.0008
0.0001
-0.14 0.085 -1.646 0.151 0.91
0.88
78.77 CRS-PC
310 Meat 1.25
1.01
0.160
0.164
7.843
6.181
0.0002
0.0005
-0.27 0.126 -2.119 0.078 0.87
0.81
52.14 CRS-PC
330 Milk, dairy pr. 1.47
0.94
0.378
0.184
3.893
5.128
0.008
0.001
-0.50 0.447 -1.11 0.30 0.62
0.65
12.43 CRS-PC
350 Other food Pr. 0.93
0.98
0.058
0.037
16.00
26.30
0.000… 0.05 0.056 0.823 0.44 0.96
0.96
189 CRS-PC
370 Beverages 1.02
0.92
0.152
0.081
6.736
11.28
0.005
0.000…
-0.08 0.084 -1.022 0.34 0.84
0.84
38.80 CRS-PC
390 Tobacco prod. 0.78
0.82
0.134
0.124
5.848
6.596
0.001
0.0003
0.10 0.089 1.116 0.31 0.13
0.23
2.165 CRS-PC
410 Textile, clothing 1.01
0.99
0.016
0.010
62.26
95.09
0.000…
0.000…
-0.02 0.033 -0.737 0.49 0.99
0.99
1204 CRS-PC
430 Leather,
       footwear.
1.33
1.11
0.203
0.260
6.59
4.27
0.0006
0.0037
-0.24 0.151 1.617 0.16 0.81
0.77
32.18 CRS-PC
450 Timber, furnit. 0.87 0.081 10.66 0.000… No 0.14 0.054 2.649 0.038 0.96 172 IRS-MC
470 Pulp, Pap, Print. 0.90 0.026 34.36 0.000… Yes 0.09 0.027 3.516 0.0126 0.99 2511 IRS-MC
490 Rub., plast. pr. 0.75 0.048 15.51 0.000… Yes 0.25 0.038 6.671 0.0005 0.99 2666 IRS-MC
510 Other manuf. 0.80 0.077 10.33 0.000… Yes 0.21 0.032 6.439 0.0007 0.95 174 IRS-MC
Table 4
Full Matrix, SHB
Sectors $1 St. error t-stat P $1 < 1 (5%) $2 St. error t-stat P Adj. R2 F Paradigm
170 Chem. Prod. 0.89
0.98
0.130
0.057
6.828
16.88
0.0005
0.000…
0.07 0.069 1.014 0.34 0.95
0.96
160 CRS-PC
190 Metal Prod. 0.93 0.022 41.98 0.000… Yes 0.07 0.013 5.142 0.002 0.99 1648 IRS-MC
210 Agr & Ind. M. 0.84 0.101 8.324 0.0002 No 0.19 0.045 4.169 0.006 0.98 368 IRS-MC
230 Office Mach. 1.07
1.02
0.069
0.057
15.49
17.99
0.000…
0.000…
-0.09 0.063 -1.361 0.222 0.95
0.95
140 CRS-PC
250 Electrical goods 0.86 0.080 10.73 0.000… Yes 0.14 0.030 4.664 0.003 0.98 530 IRS-MC
270 Motor veicl. 0.78 0.046 16.98 0.000… Yes 0.23 0.023 10.15 0.0001 0.99 1829 IRS-MC
290 Other transp.
       Equip
1.09
0.99
0.232
0.117
4.728
8.471
0.003
0.0001
-0.11 0.172 -0.665 0.53 0.87
0.88
51.34 CRS-PC
310 Meat 1.01
1.01
0.196
0.164
5.164
6.181
0.002
0.0005
-1.04E-5 0.040 -0.002 0.99 0.78
0.81
25.95 CRS-PC
330 Milk, dairy pr. 1.20
0.94
0.169
0.184
7.084
5.129
0.0004
0.001
-0.25 0.114 -2.203 0.069 0.80
0.65
29.61 CRS-PC
350 Other food Pr. 0.98
0.98
0.041
0.037
23.95
26.30
0.000…
0.000…
-0.010 0.012 -0.847 0.43 0.96
0.87
178 CRS-PC
370 Beverages 1.05
0.92
0.161
0.081
6.544
11.28
0.0006
0.000…
-0.104 0.075 -1.382 0.21 0.86
0.84
47.51 CRS-PC
390 Tobacco prod. 0.81
0.82
0.136
0.124
5.949
6.596
0.001
0.0003
0.02 0.028 0.821 0.44 0.11
0.23
1.83 CRS-PC
410 Textile, clothing 0.98
0.99
0.018
0010
53.40
95.08
0.000…
0.000…
0.01 0.001 1.540 0.17 0.99
0.99
1100 CRS-PC
430 Leather,
       footwear.
0.99
1.11
0.307
0.260
3.250
4.272
0.017
0.004
0.13 0.269 0.486 0.64 0.74
0.77
21.81 CRS-PC
450 Timber, furnit. 1.15
1.02
0.094
0.058
12.09
17.68
0.000…
0.000…
-0.13 0.089 -1.500 0.18 0.96
0.96
213 CRS-PC
470 Pulp, paper 0.91 0.021 43.57 0.000… Yes 0.08 0.014 5.230 0.002 0.99 2484 IRS-MC
490 Rubber, plastic 0.81 0.031 26.27 0.000… Yes 0.16 0.030 5.354 0.002 0.98 671 IRS-MC
510 Other manuf. 0.86 0.092 9.278 0.0001 No 0.14 0.035 4.017 0.007 0.95 143 IRS-MC
Table 5
No-Diagonal, HB
Sectors $1 St. error t-stat P $1 < 1 (5%) $2 St. error t-stat P Adj. R2 F Paradigm
170 Chem. Prod. 0.19 0.328 0.576 0.58 0.75 0.266 2.821 0.03 0.89 59.04 IRS-MC
190 Metal Prod. 0.85 0.019 43.76 0.000… Yes 0.16 0.013 11.93 0.000… 0.99 2240 IRS-MC
210 Agr & Ind. M. 0.82
1.12
0.163
0.205
5.043
5.437
0.002
0.001
0.25 0.247 1.001 0.355 0.83
0.82
36.24 CRS-PC
230 Office Mach. 1.17
0.88
0.188
0.091
6.213
9.709
0.008
0.000…
-0.27 0.155 -1.715 0.137 0.92
0.90
87.97 CRS-PC
250 Electrical goods 0.72 0.063 11.417 0.000… Yes 0.28 0.037 7.586 0.0003 0.99 784 IRS-MC
270 Motor vehicle 0.60 0.095 6.336 0.0007 Yes 0.43 0.033 13.091 0.000… 0.98 386 IRS-MC
290 Other transp.
       Equip
1.08
1.02
0.121
0.074
8.976
13.74
0.0001
0.000…
-0.06 0.049 -1.187 0.280 0.95
0.95
155 CRS-PC
310 Meat 1.06
0.94
0.055
0073
19.21
12.72
0.000…
0.000…
-0.13 0.074 -1.753 0.13 0.88
0.87
56.79 CRS-PC
330 Milk, dairy pr. 1.43
0.96
0.196
0.149
7.288
6.420
0.0003
0.0004
-0.45 0.234 -1.927 0.10 0.73
0.75
20.20 CRS-PC
350 Other food Pr. 0.87
0.96
0.040
0.043
21.57
22.22
0.000…
0.000….
0.09 0.042 2.188 0.07 0.96
0.95
205 CRS-PC
370 Beverages 1.08
0.93
0.129
0.084
8.364
11.18
0.0002
0.000…
-0.11 0.072 -1.579 0.16 0.89
0.87
59.18 CRS-PC
390 Tobacco prod. 0.76
0.80
0.131
0.125
5.810
6.471
0.001
0.0003
0.12 0.090 1.337 0.23 0.13
0.22
2.07 CRS-PC
410 Textile, clothing 0.98
0.98
0.279
0.197
3.510
5.013
0.012
0.001
0.01 0.112 0.090 0.93 0.66
0.71
15.00 CRS-PC
430 Leather,
       footwear.
1.26
1.04
0.419
0.291
2.999
3.591
0.024
0.008
-0.215 0.197 -1.092 0.32 0.65
0.64
14.32 CRS-PC
450 Timber, furnit. 0.61 0.120 5.078 0.002 Yes 0.37 0.145 2.570 0.042 0.92 86.55 IRS-MC
470 Pulp, paper 0.60 0.026 22.76 0.000… Yes 0.38 0.029 12.68 0.000… 0.99 1053 IRS-MC
490 Rubber, plastic 0.63 0.147 4.303 0.005 Yes 0.38 0.127 3.009 0.023 0.99 802 IRS-MC
510 Other manuf. 0.78 0.077 10.12 0.0001 Yes 0.22 0.034 6.604 0.0006 0.95 168.07 IRS-MC
Table 6
No-Diagonal, SHB
Sectors $1 St. error t-stat P $1 < 1 (5%) $2 St. error t-stat P Adj. R2 F Paradigm
170 Chem. Prod. 0.71 0.141 5.061 0.002 Yes 0.221 0.061 3.612 0.01 0.91 74.48 IRS-MC
190 Metal Prod. 0.89 0.024 36.36 0.000… Yes 0.11 0.014 7.231 0.0004 0.99 1977 IRS-MC
210 Agr & Ind. M. 1.62
1.12
0.492
0.205
3.283
5.437
0.017
0.001
-0.49 0.383 -1.291 0.24 0.83
0.82
36.86 CRS-PC
230 Office Mach. 0.87
0.88
0.101
0.091
8.628
9.709
0.0001
0.000…
0.88
0.90
56.86 CRS-PC
250 Electrical goods 0.86 0.023 37.50 0.000… Yes 0.15 0.009 17.25 0.000… 0.99 4825 IRS-MC
270 Motor vehicle 0.65 0.066 9.787 0.0001 Yes 0.36 0.029 12.35 0.000 0.98 668 IRS-MC
290 Other transp.
       Equip
1.05
1.02
0.154
0.074
6.893
13.74
0.0005
0.000…
-0.04 0.098 -0.438 0.94 128
0.95
CRS-PC
310 Meat 0.935
0.937
0.088
0.073
10.54
12.72
0.000…
0.000…
0.002 0.020 0.138 0.89 0.85
0.87
42.44 CRS-PC
330 Milk, dairy pr. 1.16
0.96
0.170
0.149
6.800
6.420
0.0005
0.0004
0.22 0.17 -1.303 0.24 0.81
0.75
31.14 CRS-PC
350 Other food Pr. 0.97
0.96
0.050
0.043
19,49
22.22
0.000…
0.000….
-0.0006 0.010 -0.061 0.95 0.95
0.95
141 CRS-PC
370 Beverages 1.08
0.93
0.122
0.084
8.903
11.18
0.0001
0.000…
-0.107 0.053 -1.995 0.093 0.91
0.87
74.00 CRS-PC
390 Tobacco prod. 0.79
0.80
0.135
0.125
5.872
6.471
0.001
0.0003
0.038 0.028 1.357 0.22 0.09
0.22
1.756 CRS-PC
410 Textile, clothing 1.00
0.98
0.303
0.197
3.307
5.013
0.016
0.001
-0.016 0.104 -0.158 0.87 0.66
0.71
15.01 CRS-PC
430 Leather,
       footwear.
0.74
1.04
0.250
0.291
2.946
3.591
0.026
0.008
0.30 0.332 0.897 0.40 0.67
0.64
15.24 CRS-PC
450 Timber, furnit. 1.08
1.00
0.276
0.109
3.920
9.214
0.007
0.000..
-0.079 0.183 -0.43 0.68 0.85
0.86
41.09 CRS-PC
470 Pulp, paper 0.90 0.026 34.36 0.000… Yes 0.09 0.026 3.516 0.01 0.99 2511 IRS-MC
490 Rubber, plastic 0.75 0.056 13.48 0.000… Yes 0.26 0.050 5.126 0.002 0.99 2666 IRS-MC
510 Other manuf. 0.85 0.087 9.704 0.0001 No 0.15 0.031 4.751 0.003 0.95 155 IRS-MC
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Table 7
Summary
Industrial Sectors Share of
Industrial
Output
Full Matrix No Diagonal
% HB SHB HB SHB
X170 Chem Prod. 10.98 * *
X190 Metal Prod 10.00 * * * *
X210 Agric. And Industrial Mach. 11.02 * *
X250 Electrical Goods 11.67 * * * *
X270 Motor Vehicles 07.77 * * * *
X450 Timber and Furniture 03.99 * *
X470 Pulp, Paper, Printing Prod. 08.44 * * * *
X490 Rubber and Plastic Products 04.32 * * * *
X510 Other Manufactures 01.64 * * * *
X..CRS-PC 30.15
All 18 Industrial Sectors 100.0
Totals à 58.86 54.87 58.82 54.83
X..IRS-MC 43.85
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Table 8
Pooled regressions*
Full Matrix
HB
CRS-PC. Obs = 80, R2 = 0.74 IRS-MC. Obs = 64. R2 = 0.98. F = 3196
Coeff. Estim. St.Err. t-Stat. Prob. Coeff. Estim. St.Err. t-Stat. Prob.
$1 1.02
0.97
0.085
0.048
12.05
20.16
0.000
0.000
$1 0.75 0.044 17.08 0.000
$2 -0.054 0.051 -1.075 0.29 $2 0.26 0.042 6.140 0.000
SHB
CRS-PC. Obs = 88, R2 = 0.79 IRS-MC. Obs = 56. R2 = 0.98. F = 3606
Coeff. Estim. St.Err. t-Stat. Prob. Coeff. Estim. St.Err. t-Stat. Prob.
$1 0.99
0.98
0.046
0.038
21.58
25.45
0.000
0.000
$1 0.85 0.025 34.50 0.000
$2 -0.02 0.024 -0.656 0.513 $2 0.16 0.018 8.881 0.000
No Diagonal
HB
CRS-PC. Obs = 80, R2 = 0.71 IRS-MC. Obs = 64. R2 = 0.96. F = 1658
Coeff. Estim. St.Err. t-Stat. Prob. Coeff. Estim. St.Err. t-Stat. Prob.
$1 0.97
0.96
0.078
0.051
12.45
18.74
0.000
0.000
$1 0.63 0.050 12.66 0.000
$2 -0.01 0.053 -0.119 0.905 $2 0.36 0.044 8.254 0.000
SHB
CRS-PC. Obs = 88, R2 = 0.73 IRS-MC. Obs = 56. R2 = 0.97. F = 1834
Coeff. Estim. St.Err. t-Stat. Prob. Coeff. Estim. St.Err. t-Stat. Prob.
$1 0.95
0.96
0.052
0.047
18.19
20.12
0.000
0.000
$1 0.80 0.035 23.03 0.000
$2 0.02 0.031 0.506 0.613 $2 0.20 0.032 6.279 0.000
Minimalist
X..CRS-PC. Obs = 72, R2 = 0.71 X..IRS-MC. Obs.=48, R2 =0.97, F = 2047
Coeff. Estim. St.Err. t-Stat. Prob. Coeff. Estim. St.Err. t-Stat. Prob.
$1 1.03
0.97
0.089
0.053
11.56
18.15
0.000
0.000
$1 0.81 0.029 27.83 0.000
$2 -0.06 0.051 -1.193 0.236 $2 0.19 0.035 5.509 0.000
* In the rows “$1” on the l-h-s of the table the second line represents the estimation using only the
significant variable, the R2 on the heading refer to this estimation.
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Appendix
This Appendix is in three parts: Tables, Mathematical Postscript, Trade Costs Differing
Across Sources of Demand.
A.1 Tables
Table A1
Sources of demand and manufacturing sectors
Manufacturing Sectors Sources of Demand Description
I010 Agric. Forest. Fising
I031 Coal and briquettes
I033 Lignite, briquettes
I050 Product of coking
I071 Crude petroleum
I073 Refined petroleum
I075 Natural gas
I095 Water
I097 Electric power
I098 Manufactured gases
I099 Steam, hot water
I110 Nuclear fuels
I135 Iron ore, ECSC prod.
I136 Non ECSC products
I137 Non-ferrous
I151 Cement, lime, plast.
I153 Glass
I155 Earthenware, ceramic
I157 Other minerals
X170 I170 Chemical products
X190 I190 Metal products
X210 I210 Agr. & Ind. Machines
X230 I230 Office Machines
X250 I250 Electrical goods
X270 I270 Motor vehicles
X290 I290 Other transp. equip.
X310 I310 Meat, meat products
X330 I330 Milk, dairy products
X350 I350 Other food products
X370 I370 Beverages
X390 I390 Tobacco products
X410 I410 Textile, clothing
X430 I430 Leathers, footwear
X450 I450 Timber, furniture
X470 I470 Pulp, paper, printing
X490 I490 Rubber, plastic
X510 I510 Other manufactures
I530 Building, constructions
I550 Recovery, repair
I570 Wholesale, retail trade
I590 Lodging, catering
I610 Railway transport
I613 Road transport
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I617 Inland waterways
I631 Maritime transport
I633 Air transport
I650 Auxiliary transport
I670 Communications
I690 Credit, insurance
I710 Business Services
I730 Renting immovable  Goods
I750 Market education
I770 Market health
I790 Market n.e.c.
I810 General public services
I850 Non-market education
I890 Non-market health
I930 Non-market n.e.c.
F01 Final consumption. Households
F02 Final consumption Governm.
F03 Final consumption Private
sector
F19 Gross Fix Cap. Formation
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Table A2
Average, St-Deviation, Minimum, and Maximum of import shares by sectors and countries
Nace X170 X190 X210 X230 X250 X270 X290 X310 X330 X350 X370 X390 X410 X430 X450 X470 X490 X510
DE
Av 0.33 0.13 0.25 0.31 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.07 0.16 0.17 0.27 0.03 0.37 0.49 0.17 0.11 0.21 0.19
St-D. 0.2 0.09 0.11 0.19 0.09 0.22 0.23 0.05 0.08 0.26 0.24 0.13 0.13 0.24 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.2
min 0 0 0 0 0 0.12 0 0 0.06 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
max 1 0.48 0.67 1 0.51 0.85 0.76 0.16 0.33 0.91 1 0.79 0.67 1 0.5 0.63 0.5 0.55
DN
Av 0.59 0.39 0.31 0.67 0.37 1 0.24 0.25 0.15 0.34 0.3 0.01 0.57 0.77 0.36 0.21 0.43 0.39
St-D. 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.28 0.19 0 0.25 0.25 0.16 0.31 0.17 0.02 0.24 0.31 0.25 0.12 0.14 0.21
min 0.17 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 0 0
max 0.85 0.78 0.82 1 0.83 1 0.87 0.78 0.69 1 0.63 0.08 1 1 1 0.71 0.75 0.71
ES
Av 0.13 0.08 0.18 0.49 0.16 0.18 0.13 0.19 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.51 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.09
St-D. 0.13 0.06 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.04 0.03 0.69 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.11
min 0 0 0 0 0 0.08 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 0 0 0 0
max 0.81 0.33 0.8 0.79 0.82 0.38 0.87 1 1 0.15 0.1 1 0.38 0.18 0.41 0.57 0.29 0.85
FR
Av 0.23 0.04 0.41 0.22 0.2 0.16 0.16 0.27 0.05 0.12 0.02 0.32 0.13 0.14 0.06 0.05 0.22 0.12
St-D. 0.24 0.07 0.27 0.32 0.27 0.2 0.2 0.38 0.08 0.13 0.05 0 0.2 0.23 0.12 0.1 0.3 0.21
min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.32 0 0 0 0 0 0
max 0.81 0.34 1 1 1 0.61 0.62 0.98 0.23 0.38 0.19 0.32 0.93 0.93 0.58 0.5 1 0.68
IR
Av 0.61 0.5 0.84 0.75 0.46 0.8 0.27 0.07 0.01 0.19 0.04 0.55 0.58 0.81 0.25 0.42 0.59 0.97
St-D. 0.31 0.36 0.19 0.28 0.38 0.3 0.4 0.13 0.02 0.28 0.07 0.63 0.3 0.15 0.23 0.32 0.41 0.06
min 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.11 0 0.67 0 0 0 0.8
max 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.38 0.04 0.9 0.18 1 1 1 0.63 1 1 1
IT
Av 0.18 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.1 0.28 0.2 0.11 0.13 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.2
St-D. 0.2 0.1 0.21 0.23 0.16 0.22 0.23 0.36 0.29 0.19 0.23 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.2
min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
max 0.69 0.62 1 0.95 0.58 1 0.98 1 1 0.67 0.81 0.13 0.48 0.47 0.45 0.95 0.46 0.74
NL
Av 0.53 0.4 0.43 0.2 0.39 0.3 0.2 0.24 0.11 0.13 0.23 0.15 0.53 0.52 0.26 0.21 0.59 0.1
St-D. 0.17 0.23 0.25 0.31 0.29 0.45 0.34 0.28 0.16 0.21 0.22 0.34 0.26 0.38 0.26 0.15 0.19 0.2
min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
max 0.81 1 0.95 0.67 0.9 1.85 0.9 1 0.63 1 0.71 0.98 1 1 0.92 0.93 1 0.79
UK
Av 0.34 0.09 0.19 0.41 0.29 0.18 0.38 0.13 0.16 0.22 0.06 0.12 0.21 0.21 0.36 0.13 0.23 0.25
St-D. 0.2 0.08 0.16 0.3 0.21 0.27 0.34 0.14 0.19 0.18 0.13 0.22 0.26 0.3 0.23 0.15 0.17 0.29
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Max 0.71 0.38 0.72 1 0.78 1 1 0.43 0.47 0.5 0.5 0.58 0.71 0.83 0.75 0.65 0.71 1
Nace X170 X190 X210 X230 X250 X270 X290 X310 X330 X350 X370 X390 X410 X430 X450 X470 X490 X510
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A.2  Mathematical Postscript
When trade costs are not zero and some sources of demand are home biased, system (4)
gives the following cubic equation.
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] 011 2223 =-+---+++++-++++ CCBADBACBADBAD qhqqqhqqqhq
 (A.1.)
Where:
21 / nnºh
( ) 11 1 XhXo EEA d-+º
( ) 22 1 XhXo EEB d-+º
1XhEC dº
2XhED dº
Total differentiation gives the expressions, (8b) and (8d) in the text, where
( ) ( ) 01213 2 >++-+º CADH qqq
A.3  Trade Costs Differing Across Sources Of Demand
Suppose that consumer-type “h” face trade costs JXhi and consumers-type “o” face trade
costs JXoi for sector X in i. Asume that JXoi > JXhi and that, for simplicitly, JXoi =1.
Consequently, import shares differ. This set up gives
å=
i
XhiXhiXhiXhii EENn tt //
as the solution to sub-system (4a)-(4b). This solution is analogous to equation (6) and
would again give the rationale for the empirical test in this paper.
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